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Abstract 
Advanced Innovative Biotechnologies (AIBs, see Box. 1 for definitions) are an emerging sector of 
increasing scientific and public policy interest. The sector offers the potential to deliver on the 
shared purpose of the UK and Republic of Ireland environmental authorities to protect and 
improve the environment, to protect public health and to support sustainable economic growth. 
Beyond the expected benefits it is also important to consider whether there are any potential 
hazards or environmental threats from these innovations that would not be captured by 
regulations currently in place. The technology is at an early but rapidly developing stage, 
therefore it is timely to assess the scale and likely impact  of the AIB sector in the near to distant 
future, as well as considering if the sector might present unique risks that are unconsidered by 
present regulatory approaches and what are these risk likely to be.  
To this end, a ShARE1 Programme was developed to engage a recognised expert to examine the 
opportunities and threats posed by the AIB sector as it develops. The purpose of the report is to 
drive forward a deliberative discourse on how the EAs could contribute in future to a more 
proportionate and adaptive governance system that would enable AIBs to deliver their full 
potential to the bioeconomy and the circular economy, and also to the improvement of the 
natural environment.  This report constitutes the output of this programme stream. 
                                                     
1 The ShARE (Shared Agencies Regulatory Evidence) Programme is run by a consortium of UK and Irish environment agencies: the 
Scottish Environment Protection Agency; Natural Resources Wales; the Environment Agency; Northern Ireland Environment 
Agency; and the Environmental Protection Agency Ireland 
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1. Why should the ShARE group of EAs be interested in AIBs?  -  The governance concept and 
its relationship to regulation 
Generally speaking these agencies advise their relevant Governments and other constituencies 
about issues relating to the environment and its natural resources and also act in a regulatory 
capacity for the implementation of environmental regulation. EAs have a crucial role in 
implementing governance processes in the regulatory jurisdictions they serve and, given the 
broad range of different interpretations of the term ‘governance’, it is important to clarify how it 
is used in this report. Most definitions rest on three dimensions: authority, decision-making and 
accountability, determining who has power, who makes decisions, how other players make their 
voices heard and how account is rendered2. In the context of EU policy making and regulation, 
from the 1980s the concept of governance began to acquire specific meanings arising from a 
range of pressures: the emergence of unexpected problems with technologies previously 
considered safe (e.g. organochlorine insecticides, nuclear power); a decline in public trust of 
government bodies and industry; the rapid pace of scientific development and technological 
change; the difficulties policymakers had in keeping up with this pace of change; commercial 
pressures arising from globalisation; and the role of internet-facilitated societal movements. 
Social science disciplines have played an important, but not always impartial, role in 
understanding these changes, focusing on issues of risk and innovation, questioning the authority 
of scientific expertise and the validity of scientific evidence used to support policy and regulatory 
decisions by government, and focusing on uncertainty and the precautionary principle (or 
approach) as the policy answer to these challenges (Tait, 2014).  
Alongside this new “bottom-up” governance agenda, in technology-related areas there is still a 
need for regulation based on “top-down” command and control, backed up by sanctions and 
penalties to ensure the safety of innovative products and processes to human health and the 
environment. The term ‘governance’ as used here incorporates this European interpretation of 
the governance concept (including formal legislation, less formal policy initiatives and stake 
holder concerns and issues) given that it has been so influential on the development of 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and more recently AIBs.  
Section 3.4 focuses on stakeholder perceptions of AIBs, and notes how this specifically European 
governance agenda has supported the persistent impression of public opposition to AIBs that has 
not been adaptive to increasing evidence of the safety of deliberate release of GMOs. Section 5 
introduces a new systemic approach for regulators and policy makers to think constructively 
about the governance of advanced innovative technologies in the context of AIBs and also more 
generally. It includes making governance more adaptive to the needs of industry sectors 
developing new technologies to meet societal needs, and more proportionate to potential 
hazards, while continuing to protect safety, quality and efficacy. 
The ShARE group of EAs are charged with implementing the relevant EU Directives, as they have 
been translated into national or regional regulations, to protect the environment and contribute 
to sustainable economic growth. They are also expected to alert their Governments to potential 
emerging hazards that are not covered by existing regulatory systems, with an emphasis on 
basing decisions and representations on the best available scientific evidence.  
Within the EU, as outlined in more detail in Section 3, the EAs face a major challenge in delivering 
on this remit. The GM regulatory system which is seen as the logical precedent for future 
                                                     
2 Canadian Institute on Governance (http://iog.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/About-IOG.pdf)  
8 
regulation of AIBs is widely regarded as ‘unfit for purpose’ in its present role (Baulcombe et al., 
2014; Tait, 2009c; UK Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment (ACRE), 2013). 
Challenges from these critics of the current EU regulatory system are based on:  
 the extent of political influence on regulatory decision making, as opposed to scientific 
evidence related to risks and benefits;  
 the fact that the EU regulatory system is process, rather than product-based: in the EU, 
unlike the systems in operation in most of the rest of the world, the regulatory focus is on 
the process by which a new innovation is derived (genetic modification) rather than on 
the properties of the final innovation itself (Tait, 2008);  
 the focus on uncertainty rather than evidence (Tait, 2014) supported by the EU adherence 
to a strong interpretation of the precautionary principle (PP) which, from a legal 
perspective has proved extremely difficult to implement in practice (Sunstein, 2005), and 
has enabled strong social amplification of uncertainty in dealing with AIBs (Stirling, 2014). 
Two decades of accumulating evidence, showing negligible environmental risks, and considerable 
environmental and economic benefits from the use of GM crops, has failed to expedite 
regulatory approvals for the growing of GM crops in the EU (Baulcombe et al., 2014). Raybould 
and Poppy (2012), based on research by Evans et al. (2006), have suggested that the societal 
consensus needed for the definition of clear operational objectives for a regulatory system is 
lacking, preventing the delivery of decisions based on scientific evidence (International Risk 
Governance Council (IRGC), 2009).  
Mittra et al. (2014) have suggested that new risk governance and regulatory approaches will be 
required if the EU is to retain a role in the development of AIBs with their attendant 
environmental and economic benefits in the 21st century. These new regulatory approaches will 
need to be better adapted to the opportunities presented by AIBs, and to be robust, flexible and 
democratic in the face of societal pressures while continuing to ensure safety for people and the 
environment.  
If the EU regulatory system was better adapted to the properties, hazards and benefits of GM 
crops, as is the case for example in Canada (Mittra et al., 2014), proposals to base the regulation 
of synthetic biology and other AIBs on the current GM regulatory system (Buhk, 2014) would be 
logical and unproblematic. However, the combination of: 
 a strongly politically influenced regulatory system,  
 a lack of societal consensus leading to poorly defined policy objectives,  
 the residue of an active environmental advocacy community with ideologically-motivated 
objections to the use of AIBs,  
 policy over-commitment to the precautionary principle alongside unwillingness to adapt 
existing regulatory systems to new circumstances, and uncertainty about the nature of 
future products and processes arising from AIBs, adds up to a challenging decision making 
environment for EAs.  
There is now strong evidence of the safety, quality and efficacy of the current generation of GM 
products and processes, and based on this evidence and on the nature of current proposed 
developments using from AIBs3 there is no reason to expect new types or degrees of hazard to 
arise from these AIB-related developments on a 5-10 year timescale (Buhk, 2014). Well informed 
speculation, based on experience of similar technologies and plausible scenarios about future 
                                                     
3 The circumstances are different for gene drives, as will be discussed in Section 4.4. 
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hazards and benefits is likely to be the best available basis for decision making today about the 
future regulation of AIBs. This opens up the decision making processes to advocacy based on 
vested interests and/or deeply held values (see Section 3.4) and the challenge for EAs is to 
identify such advocacy where it exists and to be equitably sceptical in their response to it.  
2.  Why should the ShARE group of EAs be interested in AIBs?  -  The potential contribution of 
AIBs to the bioeconomy. 
2.1 Potential disruptive and incremental impacts of AIBs 
The term ‘disruptive innovation’ is becoming widely used and is beginning to lose its original 
more restricted interpretation. However, distinguished from its counterpart ‘incremental 
innovation’, it remains a very useful concept when considering AIBs, their economic and societal 
impacts, and how they can most effectively be governed. Box 2 summarises the characteristics of 
disruptive and incremental innovation and notes that an innovation can be disruptive for one 
industry sector but incremental for another, as illustrated in Box 3. With any new AIB, the 
implications for policy and regulatory developments and also for societal acceptance will depend 
on the extent to which the AIB is expected to have a disruptive or incremental impact on 
particular industry sectors and the location of that impact along the development pipeline (from 
R&D through manufacture to marketing (Table 1).  
  
Box 2. Disruptive and Incremental Innovation (Tait, 2007) 
Disruptive innovation (also described as path-breaking or radical): 
 Steps outside existing paradigms leading to discontinuities in innovation pathways, to 
major shifts in product types and their place in the market, and potentially to the 
creation of new industry sectors or radical re-structuring of existing sectors. 
 Cannot be accommodated within a company’s current business model. It needs new 
areas of R&D; new modes of production; new routes to new markets.  
Incremental innovation (also described as path-dependent): 
 Presents few serious challenges to the prevailing company business models and can 
be relatively easily accommodated within them. 
 Enables stepwise improvements in a company’s current innovation system, creating 
competitive advantage within the same sector.  
An innovation that is path-breaking for one industry sector can be path dependent for 
another (see Box 3). 
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Considering the future impacts of synthetic biology for the agro-biotechnology industry sector, 
over 20 years further on from its adoption of GM crop technology, the initial disruption has been 
assimilated within current business models and the impact of the introduction of synthetic 
biology, although more powerful, targeted and effective than the initial GM technology, is likely 
to be incremental across the board. For the industrial biotechnology sector, Table 1 shows that 
synthetic biology is likely to be disruptive at the R&D and manufacturing stages of product 
development, given that the industry is moving from chemicals-based to fermentation-based 
manufacturing facilities. However it will not be disruptive of existing markets – the company will 
still to be selling a chemical product into its existing markets and these products will continue to 
be regulated through the chemicals regulatory system (REACH), or other product-specific 
regulatory systems, e.g. for foods or pharmaceuticals. 
 
Table 1. Disruptive and incremental impacts on company business models. 
Timescale 
Industry 
sector 
Techn- 
ology 
Disruptive / Incremental Change 
R&D Manufacture Markets  
1970s-80s 
Agro- 
chemicals 
Pesticides Established Established Established 
1980s-90s Ag-biotech GM crops Disruptive Disruptive Disruptive 
1980s-90s 
Seed 
industry 
GM crops Disruptive  Incremental Incremental 
2000s-10s Ag-biotech 
Synthetic 
biology 
Incremental  Incremental Incremental 
2000s-10s 
Industrial 
biotechnology 
Synthetic 
biology 
Disruptive Disruptive Incremental 
 
Box 3. Example: GM crops as a disruptive innovation 
 
Pesticide development was the established business model for the agrochemical industry 
when it first began to develop GM crops in the 1980s and GM crops were disruptive at all 
stages of the innovation process: R&D, manufacture and the market. However, the seed 
company sector at the time would have been equally well placed to develop this new 
technology, and while GM would have been disruptive for the R&D stage of development, it 
would have been incremental for the manufacture and marketing stages (Table 1). The 
policy decision not to regulate GM crops as if they were new plant varieties (the regulatory 
system most relevant to the seeds sector) but to build on the regulatory systems then in 
place for pesticides, drove development in the direction of the agrochemical industry sector 
(Tait, 2007).  
Based on a well-informed plausible scenario for GM crop decisions made in the 1980s, if GM 
crops had been developed by the seeds sector we would have had a different set of first 
generation products (not tailored to the needs of the agrochemical industry), the technology 
would have been developed more rapidly, and we could have had a different European 
public response to this new technology.  
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Box 4 summarises the range of expected 
future applications of synthetic biology 
presented as case studies in the SBLC (2016) 
Report Biodesign for the Bioeconomy. The 
microbial cell factories described in (2) will 
deliver products to be sold through existing 
markets with well-functioning existing 
regulatory systems. The only disruption in 
these cases will be to the manufacturing 
process (a shift from a chemical refinery to a 
fermentation vat) with the requirement for 
regulators to adapt the regulations and 
standards for Good Manufacturing Practice 
(GMP).  
 
 
Examples 3 and 6 in Box 4 could create new 
markets or disrupt existing markets, but the 
modification of cereal crops to fix nitrogen is unlikely to be deliverable within 5 – 10 years. There 
are currently no insect transmissible diseases in the UK or Ireland that are considered as targets 
for a GM insect control strategy, although controlling ticks that spread Lyme’s disease could 
become an attractive proposition. New detection devices based on synthetic biology (1) could be 
disruptive of existing markets but their development is seriously inhibited by current GM 
regulations in Europe and unless there is adaptation of these regulations they are unlikely to be 
manufactured or available in the EU4.  
Other examples in Box 4 (4, 7 and 8) will support existing or new value chains for product 
manufacture so will be enabling of new developments but will not themselves be disruptive in 
the sense of requiring new approaches to product regulation.  
In addition to the case studies from the SBLC (2016) strategy report, several crop developments 
relevant to the UK and Ireland, could potentially be available within 5-10 years, developed using 
GM and AIB-related techniques. Examples include: modified potatoes that are resistant to blight 
and will be less reliant on fungicide sprays to control the disease (Jones et al., 2014); or functional 
foods such as the ‘purple tomato’ produced by the John Innes Centre that will be a cheaper food 
source for the anthocyanins that are beneficial to health5. Such advances are not likely to be 
considered disruptive of existing GM-based industry sectors and could contribute to the 
bioeconomy and, in the case of the potato, benefit the environment.  
                                                     
4 J. Ajioka, University of Cambridge, personal communication. 
5 http://www.bbsrc.ac.uk/documents/natures-factories-purple-tomato-pdf/ 
Box 4. SBLC (2016) case studies  
Early stage applications of synthetic biology:  
1. Devices for the detection of, for example, 
food spoilage or arsenic in drinking water;  
2. Using microbial cell factories or GM 
plants to make novel proteins, artificial 
enzymes, omega-3 oils, hydrocarbons, 
propane, a cholesterol-lowering drug, 
menthol, grapefruit flavour, new antibiotics; 
3. Modifying cereal crops to fix nitrogen; 
4. Developing software to bring design for 
manufacturing to bio-engineering; 
5. Genetically engineered cellular robots to 
attack cancer;  
6. Control of insect-transmitted diseases 
using genetically modified mosquitos;  
7. Developing organoids for animal-free 
drug testing; and  
8. Single cell analysis systems for drug 
discovery. 
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2.2 Scale and impact of synthetic biology related developments  
The 21st century has been described as “the century of biotechnology” (Rifkin, 1998), in 
anticipation of a new industrial revolution, following on from the information and 
communication technologies (ICT) revolution that arose in the late 20th century. The Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has been a prime mover in analysing and 
projecting likely futures for this revolution - “From a broad economic perspective, the 
bioeconomy refers to the set of economic activities relating to the invention, development, 
production and use of biological products and processes. If it continues on course, the 
bioeconomy could make major socioeconomic contributions … to improve health outcomes, 
boost the productivity of agriculture and industrial processes, and enhance environmental 
sustainability.” (OECD, 2009). 
The current scale of the UK bioeconomy is estimated to be least £150 Bn Gross Value Added 
(GVA), potentially increasing by a further £40 Bn over the coming decade and it supports approx. 
600K jobs (Chambers et al., 2015). Synthetic biology is expected to transform the sustainability 
and productivity of the industries that contribute to the bioeconomy. However, as noted in the 
Innogen Centre contribution to the OECD Bioeconomy to 2030 report (Tait et al., 2007), whether 
this is realised in the future will depend, among other things, on the nature of the regulatory and 
governance systems imposed on the development, marketing and use of these technologies.  
A primary role for synthetic biology, as a platform technology, is seen to be facilitation of future 
contributions to the bioeconomy, with frequent references to the potential for this innovation to 
be disruptive – a move from an old-style approach involving harvesting resources that are cheap 
and plentiful to managing resources that are scarce and valuable6. The Chambers et al., (2015) 
analysis of the impact of the bioeconomy on the UK economy (Figure 1) differentiates the value 
of the direct bioeconomy (the sectors that actually produce bio-based products), alongside those 
of the upstream bioeconomy (providing inputs to the direct bioeconomy) and of the downstream 
bioeconomy (using the outputs of the direct bioeconomy) (Figures 2 and 3). However, as noted 
above, the early impacts of AIBs are likely to be mainly incremental rather than disruptive. Also, 
of the sectors identified in Figure 1, the relatively small industrial biotechnology sector is the only 
one currently considering major investments in AIBs. The food sector could currently benefit 
from these technologies but, like agriculture and fishing, for a variety of reasons, it is not likely to 
be an early adopter. 
Figure 1. Contribution of the direct bioeconomy to the UK economy (Chambers et al., 2015) 
 
  
                                                     
6 www.sixthwave.org 
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Figure 2. Descriptive summary of the UK bioeconomy (Chambers et al., 2015) 
 
 
The largest industry sectors in the direct 
bioeconomy (agriculture and fisheries, 
forestry and logging, water supply, food and 
drinks) together deliver £35.14 Bn to the UK 
economy, compared to industrial 
biotechnology (£995 M). Yet, industrial 
biotechnology is the only large scale industry 
sector that currently envisages an important 
role for synthetic biology in its future 
development (US National Research Council, 
2015; SBLC, 2016). The other industry sectors 
described in Figure 2 are all somewhat 
conservative and so far reluctant to adopt 
AIBs. If the UK bioeconomy is to benefit from 
the potential contributions of synthetic 
biology (OECD, 2009) (Box 5), regulatory 
conditions and societal acceptance are 
among the most important factors that will 
need to be addressed. Figure 4 describes 
how this contribution is expected to operate, 
from academic research, through the 
synthetic biology enabling platform, to a 
broad range of industry sectors. The latest 
report from the UK SBLC (2016) further 
charts the potential contribution of synthetic 
biology to the bioeconomy (Box 6). 
Box 5. OECD: Bioeconomy to 2030 (OECD, 
2009) 
…biotechnology could contribute up to 2.7% 
of 2030 GDP in OECD countries … and even 
more in non-OECD countries.  
…by 2015…virtually all new drugs, about half 
of major crops around the world, and an 
increasing number of everyday products will 
be produced using biotechnology (perhaps an 
over-optimistic projection) 
The bioeconomy offers technological 
solutions for many challenges facing the 
world…but achieving its potential will require 
appropriate national, regional, and in some 
cases, global policies. 
In the longer term, the emerging bioeconomy 
will be significantly influenced by 
technological developments, regulatory 
conditions*, intellectual property, human 
resources, social acceptance*, market 
structure, and business models*…addressing 
these needs to start today. 
*Our emphasis, particularly relevant to this 
report 
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Figure 3. GVA from direct activities of the 
bioeconomy in the UK (2012) (£M) Chambers et al., 
2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Box 6. UK SBLC (2016) Strategy 
Report: Contributing to the future 
bioeconomy 
Synthetic biology provides a rapidly 
advancing capability to develop 
solutions to key challenges across 
the bioeconomy, spanning health, 
chemicals, advanced materials, 
energy, food, security and 
environmental protection. In 
recent years, the concept of a 
bioeconomy has evolved with 
potential for rapid and significant 
growth. Several countries have 
developed explicit bioeconomy 
strategies, reflecting the potential 
for biology as an economic force. 
Although there is currently no 
official UK bioeconomy strategy, 
the size of the UK bioeconomy is 
currently estimated to be worth at 
least £150bn GVA, potentially 
increasing by a further £40bn over 
the coming decade. Synthetic 
biology currently plays a small role 
in the overall bioeconomy but lies 
at its innovative heart. The 
development of higher-level 
biodesign capabilities could 
become a critical component of 
productivity and UK 
competitiveness in years to come, 
especially when international 
market growth opportunities are 
taken into account. Close links have 
been forged between the SBLC and 
the Industrial Biotechnology 
Leadership Forum (IBLF) and the 
Agri-Tech Leadership Council 
(ATLC), to ensure alignment 
between the role and potential 
value of synthetic biology and this 
broader vision for the UK 
bioeconomy. 
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Figure 4. Contribution of synthetic biology to the bioeconomy (UK Synthetic Biology 
Coordination Group, 2012, p13) 
 
These potential benefits to the economy and the environment can clearly contribute to 
sustainable development and to the overall goal of reducing the human ecological footprint 
(Wackernagel and Rees, 1996), bringing synthetic biology into focus as a potentially major factor 
in the ‘circular economy’, as espoused by the governments of all the EAs involved in ShARE 
(Natural Scotland, 2016; Chamberlain et al., undated; HoC Environmental Audit Committee, 
2014; Mitchell and Doherty, 2015; EPA, 2014).  
2.3 Innovation policy support for synthetic biology 
There is considerable UK Government support for AIBs at the research stage and also 
translational funding to support early innovation stages of development to help small companies 
to cross the ‘valley (or valleys) of death’ (a term used to describe the lack of commercial 
investment at several stages in the development pathway for an AIB (Omidvar et al., 2014; House 
of Commons (HoC) Science and Technology Committee, 2013). Mazzucatto (2011) has 
commented, as an economist, on the necessity for state support in the early stages of 
development of innovative technologies. The Innogen Institute has looked at this economic 
analysis from a more systemic perspective and pointed out that such state support for innovation 
will struggle to have the expected economic impact where, as in the case of life science 
innovation, regulatory systems are expensive, time consuming and difficult for companies, 
particularly small companies, to negotiate (Tait, 2007; Tait and Chataway, 2007) (see Section 3.6).  
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The following are some of the current UK Government financial support initiatives that are 
relevant to AIBs. 
 Eight Great Technologies. The support for the UK’s Eight Great Technologies was 
announced by the then Minister for Science in 20137. Synthetic biology (with £88M 
investment) was included among these technologies and two other Great Technologies 
relevant for synthetic biology-related innovation were Agri-tech (£30M investment) and 
Regenerative Medicine (£20M investment). The inclusion of synthetic biology among the 
Eight Great Technologies has been a particularly important determinant of its success to 
date, including for example the recent announcement of the setting up of an Eight Great 
Technologies Investment Fund with a target of £300M8.  
 Scottish Innovation Centres: In 2012, the Scottish Funding Council announced a £120M 
fund, to set up Innovation Centres9 to link academics with industry in the development of 
innovative new technologies. The two most relevant to synthetic biology are the 
Industrial Biotechnology Innovation Centre (IBioIC) and the Stratified Medicine Innovation 
Centre. 
 Catapults: A group of Catapult Centres10 has been set up to “…transform the UK’s 
capability for Innovation and drive future growth” through a combination of state and 
commercial funding, the most relevant for synthetic biology being Cell and Gene Therapy, 
Medicines Discovery and Precision Medicine. 
 Catalysts: Significant amounts of government and commercial funding are also being 
invested in a series of Catalysts11 designed to support interdisciplinary research initiatives 
and early stage commercial development, the most relevant to synthetic biology being 
the Biomedical Catalyst, the Industrial Biotechnology Catalyst, the Agritech Catalyst and 
the Energy Catalyst. 
The Synthetic Biology Leadership Council (SBLC), another UK Government policy initiative in 
support of synthetic biology, was set up to provide a governance body to assess progress, update 
recommendations and shape priorities for future implementation of synthetic biology in the UK. 
It provides strategic coordination between the funding agencies, the research community, 
industry, government sponsors and other stakeholders. The SBLC Governance Subgroup12 has the 
task of providing support and advice to the SBLC on governance, policy and regulation, citizen 
and stakeholder engagement, and communication, as they relate to research and technology 
development in synthetic biology. Along with the Agri-Tech Leadership Council and the Industrial 
Biotechnology Leadership Forum the SBLC works to ensure that the UK effectively harnesses its 
world-class research and innovation base to develop the bioeconomy.  
2.4 Future prospects for AIBs 
Although the contribution of synthetic biology to the bioeconomy is currently modest, the scale 
and reach of government policies in this area are an indication of the determination to ensure 
that the UK is able to benefit significantly in future from its current investments in the basic 
                                                     
7 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eight-great-technologies 
8 http://www.zgc.gov.cn/document/20151228161054343989.pdf 
9 http://www.sfc.ac.uk/Priorities/Innovation/InnovationCentres.aspx 
10 https://www.catapult.org.uk/ 
11 https://interact.innovateuk.org/-/catalysts 
12 https://connect.innovateuk.org/web/synthetic-biology-special-interest-group/governance-sub-group 
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science and early translational stages of development. The government funding initiatives 
outlined above are undoubtedly having an impact on the scale of activity in this area in the UK. 
However, as with all new areas of innovation, there has been considerable hyping of expectations 
around the technology, partly designed to secure funding and political support. However, 
whether and how rapidly this potential is realised will depend on a broad range of factors: (i) 
Kwok (2010) pointed to ‘five hard truths for synthetic biology’, mainly related to the greater 
complexity and unpredictability of dealing with biology rather than more straightforward 
engineering in manufacturing processes; (ii) the economic realities of dealing with synthetic 
biology can lead to unexpected outcomes, for example the recent closure of Sanofi’s 
manufacturing facility using synthetic biology to produce the anti-malarial drug artemisinin, 
because of low-price competition from farmers growing the Artemisia plant in the traditional 
manner (Peplow, 201613); and perhaps most important the governance processes we put in place 
for AIBs in future (Tait, 2008).  
Thus, although AIBs are likely to benefit the UK economy, as noted in the following sections there 
will be numerous policy and regulatory opportunities either to constrain or encourage this 
process. Innovation processes rarely proceed according to plan and eventual success will depend 
on long term commitment by governments and industry, and a willingness to adapt both 
innovation processes and governance systems to unexpected outcomes, positive or negative. 
 
3 Regulation and governance of GMOs and future AIBs 
This section summarises the regulatory systems currently in place for GM-related technologies, 
given that they are likely to be applied to AIBs in future, and indicates how they are seen to be 
performing in light of our current understanding of the risks and benefits of GMOs. The 
precautionary principle (PP) is an important feature of EU environmental regulation and its role 
in the governance of GMOs in Europe is also assessed, along with evolving public attitudes to the 
technology. The EU regulatory system has been the subject of sustained criticism from research 
organisations, lawyers, government bodies involved in advising on regulatory issues and 
academic researchers, and some of these arguments are also summarised here.  
3.1 Potential environmental benefits of AIBs 
The impacts on the bioeconomy outlined in Section 2 are supported by a range of government 
policies because they are seen, among other things, to have the capacity to improve the 
ecological footprint of important industry sectors, for example in mitigating climate change, 
improving food security and reducing agriculture-related pollution (Figure 5). Although outside 
the scope of this report it is useful to note that Africa and Asia are seen as important potential 
beneficiaries of these new more advanced AIBs in their agricultural systems and Whitty et al, 
(2013) have called for a more rational debate on this potential that is not dominated by Europe’s 
politicised arguments.  
Overall current synthetic biology developments are seen as incremental innovations, based on 
more powerful and accurate GM-related techniques than we have had at our disposal in the past, 
but not leading to radically new challenges to existing markets or regulatory systems (Section 
3.5). Two areas where synthetic biology could have more potentially disruptive implications both 
involve ecosystem related applications: 
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 Interestingly, there is no reference to this event on the Sanofi website. 
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i. Synthetic biology is being considered as an aid to saving endangered species and 
returning extinct ones. This issue is controversial and Redford et al. (2013) have analysed 
both sides of the argument, noting that both the problems and the solutions are ‘wicked’ 
“… messy, intractable, subject to multiple interpretations, and for which solutions at 
present are not evident or inscrutable”. 
ii. A recent development of synthetic biology, the gene drive, can be seen as raising a similar 
set of issues to those addressed by Redford et al. (2013) although the aim here is species 
elimination, rather than species introduction. This technique has been proposed, for 
example, to eliminate an invasive species from an ecosystem, and also to remove disease-
carrying insects such as mosquitoes transmitting malaria, dengue fever or zika virus (US 
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2016). 
Neither of these developments is likely to move beyond the basic research stages within the next 
5 – 10 years, and it is not yet clear how these more disruptive innovations will be regulated in 
future. However, the development pathway in both cases is likely to be through a one-off state-
supported initiative, given that these applications do not have a conceivable commercially viable 
business model that would support the involvement of a company, other than in partnership 
with a government initiative. It is important to distinguish gene drive technology, expected to 
lead to permanent elimination of a species, from the business approach developed by the 
company Oxitec, currently being applied in several disease-affected areas of the world with the 
approval of the relevant governments and of local populations14 (Lacroix, et al., 2012), which will 
require repeated release of the sterile male mosquitoes. 
Figure 5. Scale of GMO uptake: environmental and other benefits 
 
3.2 Potential environmental hazards of AIBs 
The Statement of Requirements for this report refers particularly to potential risks of synthetic 
biology and the implications for environmental regulation. The techniques defined in Box 1 under 
the heading of AIBs are considered to be part of the GM and synthetic biology toolbox and they 
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 http://www.oxitec.com/ 
http://www.isaaa.org/resources/videos/
globalstatusreport2014/default.asp
GM Crops in Use
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will be considered together here, with the exception of the gene drive15. Where AIBs are used in 
the manufacture of non-living products they can be seen as ‘platform technologies’, sets of tools 
and techniques that can lead to the development of innovative products and processes that are 
likely to be covered by existing regulatory systems for chemicals, foods and drugs, involving 
contained use of GMOs. Where the innovation involves deliberate release of a living modified 
organism and will be regulated on that basis, regulators could build on the experience of a 
number of countries that are ahead of the EU in this respect and adapt regulatory systems to 
new circumstances. The main difference between synthetic biology and GM techniques is that, 
whereas GM involves the transfer of individual genes from one species to another, synthetic 
biology and gene synthesis assemble complex novel genomes from a set of standardized genetic 
components to deliver the target molecules or effects in a more predictable and efficient manner 
than was possible with the more primitive GM approaches.  
Although some of these techniques are not yet included under the legally-based regulatory 
system in place for GMOs this is expected to be the regulatory precedent that will be applied to 
all AIBs in future, with modifications where necessary. There is no evidence base for the 
prediction that the greater power and precision of AIBs will, in commercial application, lead to 
new or increased environmental hazards. Indeed, their greater precision and hence their greater 
predictability may lead to less uncertainty about future hazards and a greater ability to regulate 
them on the basis of scientific evidence rather than conjecture and speculation (see Section 3.3).  
This is not to advocate complacency in the face of potential hazards arising from future 
developments of AIBs and regulators and innovators will need to remain vigilant but at the same 
time to build on the experience of the safe development of first generation GM technologies 
under a range of regulatory approaches in many parts of the world.  
One important area of concern relates to biosecurity threats arising from AIBs, i.e. malicious use 
by those intent on causing harm, or accidental misuse in the course of legitimate scientific 
research, and the anticipated scale of this threat has a much higher profile in the USA than in 
Europe. The greatest, and least controllable, threat is likely to come from state-sponsored 
terrorism and, while there is general agreement that these risks remain extremely low16, UK 
industrial providers are being vigilant. For example, consortia of providers have instigated gene 
synthesis order-screening procedures17, and the recently established DNA foundries in the UK 
have signed-up, or are in the process of signing-up, to such consortia (SBLC, 2016). It is also 
important to understand that one of the best defences against future accidental or deliberate 
misuse, or indeed against a much more likely naturally occurring pandemic disease, is to have 
appropriate diagnostics, vaccines and antibiotics already available or able to be developed in a 
very short timescale. Synthetic biology tools, along with appropriate regulatory adaptation to 
facilitate rapid responses, are the key to delivery of this defence (Lowrie and Tait, 2011; 
Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, 2010; SBLC, 2016). 
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 Gene drives, given the intentional spread of the modified organism within ecosystems, may require a different 
regulatory approach from those currently in operation for GM and other closely related biotechnologies. 
16
 Workshop report - Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity. 
https://www.kcl.ac.uk/newsevents/news/newsrecords/docs/Jefferson-et-al-2014-Synthetic-Biology-and-
Biosecurity.pdf 
17 Screening framework - guidance for providers of synthetic double-stranded DNA. 
http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/legal/guidance/syndna/Documents/syndna-guidance.pdf 
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3.3 The role of the precautionary principle (PP) in the governance of AIBs in the EU. 
The PP was proposed in response to a series of unexpected hazards arising from chemicals that 
had been approved through relevant regulatory systems, for example the impact of 
organochlorine insecticides on the breeding success of top predators. Emerging from a German 
approach to environmental regulation (von Moltke, 1987), a case was made for its adoption as 
the basis of the regulatory system for GMOs in the UK (Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution, 1989). The UK legislative process was then influential on subsequent developments in 
the EU (Tait and Levidow, 1992) and the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).  
Over time the PP began to acquire a number of interpretations related to the degree of 
precaution to be implemented, and the Commission of the European Communities (2000) issued 
advice on its adoption, supplemented recently by some additional guidance18 (Box 7), noting that 
“… decision-makers are constantly faced with the dilemma of balancing the freedom and rights of 
individuals, industry and organisations with the need to reduce the risk of adverse effects to the 
environment, human, animal or plant health”.  
These guidelines, along with the expected regulatory principles of proportionality and adaptation 
(Tait and Banda, 2016a, b) enshrined in these European Commission documents, have not yet 
been applied in Europe in the context of environmental release of living GMOs, largely because 
of political constraints (Mittra et al., 2014) (although the contained use of GMOs has presented 
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 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/Txt/?uri=URISERV:132042 
Box 7. EU Guidance on Implementation of the Precautionary Principle 
The adoption of the PP is appropriate where “…scientific evidence is insufficient, inconclusive 
or uncertain and there are indications through preliminary objective scientific evaluation 
(our emphasis) that there are reasonable grounds for concern that the potentially dangerous 
effects on the environment, human, animal or plant health may be inconsistent with the 
chosen level of protection”. The document published by the Commission of the European 
Communities (2000) emphasised the need to find a balance so that “… proportionate, non-
discriminatory, transparent and coherent actions can be taken” based on: 
 examination of the potential benefits and costs of action or lack of action (including, 
where appropriate and feasible, an economic cost/benefit analysis);  
 review in the light of new scientific data; and  
 assigning responsibility for producing the scientific evidence necessary for a more 
comprehensive risk assessment.  
An update (2015) on the use of the PP in the EU (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/Txt/?uri=URISERV:132042) stresses that the PP can never be invoked to justify 
arbitrary decisions, requiring the following elements relevant to the development of AIBs:  
 examination of the benefits and costs of action or lack of action; 
 identification of potentially adverse effects; 
 evaluation of the scientific data available;  
 consideration of the extent of scientific uncertainty; 
 participation of all interested parties in the study of precautionary measures, after the 
results of a scientific and/or risk evaluation have been made available; 
 review of measures in light of scientific developments. 
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few such problems). Indeed, much more extreme versions of the PP have been invoked by Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) commenting on GM and AIB-related developments and 
these extreme interpretations could be influential on European public opinion related to 
AIBs19,20.  
Any regulatory decision to use the precautionary principle as a basis for additional restrictions on 
the development of AIBs should first undertake the kind of review recommended in Box 7. It is 
relevant to note that, if the current European interpretation of the PP had been in operation 
globally for the development of GMO technologies, we would have had no evidence for their 
safety or for any of the benefits. 
3.4 Stakeholder engagement and public attitudes to GMOs and AIBs 
The deliberate release, but not the contained use, of GMOs in the EU has been very contentious. 
For example, a 2005 Eurobarometer survey (Gaskell et al., 2006), found that there was 
widespread support for medical and industrial biotechnologies, but considerable opposition to 
agricultural biotechnologies in all but a few countries. When asked about GM food, a majority of 
the 50% of Europeans who had a settled opinion on the subject thought that GM food should not 
be encouraged – it was seen as not being useful, as morally unacceptable and as a risk for society 
(58 per cent opposed and 42 per cent supported the use of the technology). Supporters 
outnumbered opponents only in Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Czech Republic and 
Lithuania (Gaskell et al., 2006). The lesson drawn for agri-food biotechnology was that unless 
new crops and products are seen to have consumer benefits, the public would continue to be 
sceptical about their use. Figure 6 gives more detailed information from this report, showing 
responses to different types of benefits incorporated within GM foods21. 
There are hints in more recent surveys that public attitudes to current GM technologies are less 
negative than they have been in the past (Royal Society of Edinburgh (RSE), 2015). In a recent 
Ipsos Mori (2014) poll on Public Attitudes to Science, more people in the UK said that the benefits 
of GM crops are greater than the risks, by 36% to 28%. When asked about the statement 
whether “Genetically modified crops are needed to increase world food production,” 57% agreed 
against 15% who disagreed. When asked to consider a more general proposition that “We should 
not rule out any agricultural techniques or technologies that might help to increase world food 
production” 80% agreed against 9% who disagreed. However, these questions are phrased in 
such a way as to invite a positive response, described as ‘leading statements’. 
                                                     
19 http://www.etcgroup.org/content/extreme-genetic-engineering-introduction-synthetic-biology 
20 
http://www.synbioproject.org/process/assets/files/6620/_draft/principles_for_the_oversight_of_synthetic_biology.
pdf 
21 The summary of the report by Gaskell et al. (2006, p4) states that these figures refer to the 50% of the survey 
respondents who had a settled opinion on the subject, equating to 29% of the total survey population opposed to 
the use of the technology and 21% in support, but this factor (very relevant to the interpretation of the data) is not 
referred to elsewhere in the report. 
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Figure 6. Reasons for buying GM foods (Gaskell et al., 2006, pp 4 and 22). 
 
 
A smaller unpublished survey commissioned in 2012 by the British Science Association as part of 
National Science and Engineering Week22 demonstrated similar levels of decline in opposition to, 
along with a decline in support for, GM foods in general, with citizens having moved more into 
the neutral/don’t know categories compared to previous surveys. Where there were significant 
public benefits, for example, the production of rice crops with enhanced levels of vitamin A, in 
this survey, over 64% supported the use of such a crop, with only 13% opposed. Similarly, 
producing wheat crops with reduced susceptibility to aphids, thereby reducing the use of 
pesticides, was also supported by 58%, with only 15% against, but again these are leading 
statements (RSE, 2015).  
A detailed analysis of opinion polling data is beyond the scope of this report. However, although 
the degree of negativity may be declining, there is still a vociferous minority of respondents (the 
above quoted data would suggest around 15-20%) who are likely to oppose the development of 
GM technologies, no matter what the benefits. This relates to an important factor that is 
essential to understanding how to interpret public survey data and is ignored in almost all 
surveys – the psychological foundation of the opinions being expressed (Tait, 1988; 2001; 2014). 
Table 2 summarises the different characteristics of a stakeholder dialogue when participants’ 
opinions are based mainly on ‘what is in my interests’ (left hand side of the table) and on ‘my 
deeply held values or principles’ (right hand side of the table). In the middle, and not to scale, are 
the uncommitted members of the public who either don’t know or don’t care (or both) about the 
issue under discussion, variable in number but often around 60%.  
Table 2 can be seen as summarising the criteria that would enable participants in a dialogue or its 
organisers to recognise the basis on which different parties are contributing (Tait, 2001) and by 
these criteria the public and stakeholder dialogue in the EU has been led and framed by 
participants with ideological, value based perspectives. Although presented here for clarity as a 
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dichotomy, it is important to stress that stakeholder motivations will always entail a complex 
mixture of factors. In many areas of stakeholder dialogue, this dichotomy may not even be 
apparent. However in the case of the European dialogue on GM crops, this does correspond with 
the observed situation. The key to understanding the percentage of a population that is engaging 
with an issue from an ideological perspective is to focus on those who continue to give negative 
responses when asked leading questions about positively beneficial applications of a technology, 
e.g. the 15% who disagreed that “GM crops are needed to increase world food production” in the 
Ipsos MORI (2014) poll described above. 
For participants on the right hand side of Table 2, the only evidence considered relevant to a 
decision is information that supports the case they want to make and, on occasion, research 
conducted with the intent to deliver such supporting evidence has been found to be invalid (e.g. 
Seralini et al., 2012). The intractable nature of EU public opinion is partly due to the attention 
that has been given in media and policy circles to opinions that are based on deeply held, 
probably immutable values backed up by all the other features represented on the right hand 
side of Table 2. It could also be claimed that the introduction of the precautionary principle 
(Section 3.3) was an important factor in enabling these value-based agendas to gain so much 
traction on EU policy decision making (Tait, 2014).   
Table 2. Characteristics of environment and technology-related conflicts 
 
 
This generally unrecognised distinction is key to understanding how to interpret and act on the 
data from surveys of public opinion. It will, for example determine the extent to which public 
opinion is likely to change in response to new evidence of the hazards, safety or benefits of 
existing and new AIBs. Where there is a significant proportion of ideologically based opposition 
or commitment to a particular technology, dialogue can increase polarisation of opinion rather 
than leading towards consensus (Sunstein, 2009). It also raises the question, “Under what 
circumstances is it valid in a democracy to permit a minority of the population to determine the 
opportunities (economic and life-style related) available to the rest of the population?”  
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Finding a way to guide the dialogue on AIBs towards a more equitably evidence-based approach 
will be necessary if the UK and RoI are to benefit from the potential contribution of these 
technologies to the bioeconomy, including devising regulatory systems that are proportionate to 
the expected hazards. A stance of equitable scepticism, towards the arguments of companies 
attempting to serve their economic interests (left hand side of Table 2), and towards advocacy 
groups intent on furthering their values (right hand side of Table 2), might be a good starting 
point. Equitable scepticism as a basis for decision making could be a potentially useful counter-
balance to the more frequent emphasis on trust as an aspirational goal for authority figures. 
There have been fewer studies of citizen views on synthetic biology and industrial biotechnology 
but those available have been summarised in two reports from Sciencewise, a government 
funded programme to support the role of public dialogue in policy making, providing advice and 
guidance to help policy makers to understand and take into account the views and values of the 
public in the development of policy involving science and technology (Boxes 8 and 9).  
 
Box 8. Public views of synthetic biology 
(Sciencewise, 2013)  
Sciencewise noted that there are “a number 
of major possible social, ethical and 
environmental risks and challenges, including 
bioterrorism, commercial monopolies, and 
the philosophical and religious concerns 
associated with creating artificial life” but 
that overall there is low public awareness of 
the sector. 
Commonly held views include:  
 extremes; it is both exciting and scary  
 the need for regulation and control 
which could keep up with 
developments in the sector  
 synthetic biology could lead to the 
transgression of nature  
 optimism is high: the technology 
presents solutions to some of the 
world’s major challenges  
 the motivation of scientists in this 
sector has been questioned  
 synthetic biology could produce big 
winners, and big losers  
 given that the public consider 
themselves powerless to influence 
the sciences more generally, scientists 
have a responsibility to consider the 
wider implications of their work  
Box 9. Public views of industrial 
biotechnology (Sciencewise, 2015)  
Public opinion on industrial biotechnology is 
broadly positive but fluctuates in response to 
international events and technological 
developments. There is little recent in-depth 
research.  
Public opinion is highly dependent on 
context, the technology under consideration, 
and the question asked. 
While there is awareness of the potential 
risks, the overall attitude to industrial 
biotechnology is positive. Public scepticism 
about its wide-scale adoption is often linked 
with mistrust of government and industry. 
Medical applications viewed more 
favourably than agricultural ones but people 
are not uncritically positive or negative 
about either technology. 
There is concern about the use of bioenergy, 
partly due to the implications of land use for 
fuel crops. 
Little is known about public opinion on the 
emerging third and fourth generation 
biofuels derived from algal technologies, or 
genetically engineered plants. 
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The evidence quoted above that European public attitudes to GM and related technologies are 
becoming more neutral and less polarised, could provide an opportunity for policy makers and 
regulators in the EU to focus their attention on actual and potential hazards and benefits and 
their probabilities, rather than on politics and public attitudes when making decisions on 
regulatory questions (Tait and Barker, 2011). Treating the EU regulatory process for GM as the 
precedent for regulation of synthetic biology, and probably other AIBs, is a logical choice in most 
of the world but, in the EU there is a potential for this decision to lead to serious and unnecessary 
inhibition of the development of AIBs unless the political biases involved in the operation of the 
EU system are removed (Tait and Barker, 2011; Tait, 2009b; Mittra et al., 2014). 
3.5 Current regulatory systems for GMOs 
In the EU, and hence also in the UK, the regulatory system for AIBs is likely to be based on that 
currently in place for GMOs where the most important regulatory distinction is between GMOs in 
contained use and their deliberate release to the environment.  
3.5.1 Contained use 
Where GMOs are contained within a fermentation vat or a glasshouse or other such facility, and 
only the resulting, non-living products are circulated beyond containment, these products will be 
regulated as foods, drugs, fuels or chemicals and will be covered by the appropriate regulatory 
systems for these products. The regulatory system that applies to their production will be the EU 
Contained Use Directive (Directive 2009/41/EC) and the UK Contained Use Regulations 
(Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) Regulations 2014) developed to ensure our 
compliance with the EU Directive. To summarise the UK arrangements for implementation of 
these Regulations, as stated on the HSE website23, 
The UK competent authority (CA) for the Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) 
Regulations (GMO(CU)) comprises representatives of the four responsible authorities in 
the UK. The GMO(CU) 2014 regulations apply to England, Scotland and Wales. The 
GMO(CU) (Northern Ireland) 2015 Regulations apply to Northern Ireland. 
In England and Wales, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the Secretary of State 
for the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) acting jointly form 
the competent authority. The functions are delegated to HSE and DEFRA officials. Officials 
from the Welsh Government are included in any matters relating to Wales. 
In Scotland, the competent authority comprises Scottish Ministers and HSE acting jointly 
and similarly, and these functions are delegated to HSE and Scottish Government officials. 
In Northern Ireland, the competent authority is the Health and Safety Executive for 
Northern Ireland (HSENI) and the Department of the Environment, acting jointly. HSENI 
officials are provided with technical support from HSE, under an Agency Agreement. 
The relevant UK advisory committee is the Scientific Advisory Committee on Genetic 
Modification (Contained Use) (SACGM). 
The UK CA provides the mechanism by which agreement on policies related to GMO(CU)-
related business will be sought.  
There is a presumption that contained uses of GMOs present minimal hazard to the natural 
environment and the regulatory requirements are correspondingly less demanding than for 
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deliberate release. However, some of the NGOs campaigning in this area are proposing that, for 
synthetic biology, contained uses of modified organisms should be subject to the same regulatory 
system as deliberate release24. The main forum through which these representations are 
currently being made is the discussion on the need to revise the UN Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) to take on board any additional risks that might be entailed in synthetic biology 
related developments. However, given the broad range of opinions being expressed in CBD-
related fora (see Section 4.2) it would be surprising if such propositions were incorporated within 
future revisions to the CBD. 
3.5.2 Deliberate release 
Most relevant to the concerns of ShARE is the deliberate environmental release of living 
organisms modified using AIBs into the natural environment, for example a GM crop or a micro-
organism developed for environmental remediation. The EU regulatory instrument is the 
Deliberate Release Directive (Directive 2001/18/EC), implemented in the UK through the 
Environmental Protection Act 1990, Section 111 and 112 and the Genetically Modified Organisms 
(Deliberate Release) Regulations 200225.  
For the innovations listed in Box 4, using cells as factories (2) or for drug discovery (8) are clearly 
contained uses, whereas GM cereal crops (3) or mosquitoes (6) are clearly deliberate releases. 
However, the distinction between these two regulatory categories is not always clear cut. For the 
arsenic detection device (1), although the GM cells (the active component) are contained within 
the device and are regulated through the Contained Use Regulations, regulators are concerned 
that they could ‘escape’ into the natural environment due to an accident in use and so this is also 
being regulated under the Deliberate Release Directive. Also included under the Deliberate 
Release heading are GM viral vaccines and other medical treatments for humans or animals 
involving living modified organisms.  
The UK Lead Territorial Competent Authority for Deliberate Release is the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), advised by the Advisory Committee on Releases to 
the Environment (ACRE)26. Applications for approval to market a product (including crop seeds 
for cultivation, foods or feeds) are assessed and decided upon at EU level by the EU Food Safety 
Authority, while applications to release a GMO for research and development purposes are 
considered at national levels. The assessment process for GM release or marketing applications 
considers potential safety factors such as toxicity, allergenicity, and the fate of any possible 
transfer of novel genes to other organisms. The dossier of relevant information to cover these 
points is scrutinised by ACRE. 
The Scottish competent authority27 for deliberate release to the environment is the CAP Reform 
Crops Policy Branch at the Scottish Government, Agriculture and Food Division. Consents for 
releasing GMOs into the environment for research purposes are granted on a case by case basis 
by Scottish Ministers. A detailed risk assessment must be submitted to the CAP Reform and Crop 
Policy Team and is considered by ACRE. Scottish Ministers also consult Science and Advice for 
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Scottish Agriculture (SASA), the Health and Safety Executive, the UK Food Standards Agency and 
Scottish Natural Heritage.  
In Wales, the relevant regulations are the Genetically Modified Organisms (Deliberate Release) 
(Wales) Regulations 2002 and the National Assembly for Wales is the relevant competent 
authority28. 
The relevant legislation in Northern Ireland is the Genetically Modified Organisms (Deliberate 
Release) Regulations (Northern Ireland) SR 2003/167 and release of a GMO would require 
consent from the Department of the Environment for Northern Ireland.  
In Ireland29, the GMO (Deliberate Release) Regulations, S.I. No 500 of 2003 give effect to EU 
Directive 2001/18/EC on the deliberate release into the environment of GMOs. The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is the Competent Authority in Ireland for the 
implementation of the GMO Regulations on the contained use, the deliberate release and the 
transboundary movement of GMOs into the environment. 
3.5.3 EU opt-out legislation 
In 2015 the European Parliament and the Council amended Directive 2001/18/EC and approved 
Directive (EU) 2015/41230 to allow Member States to restrict or prohibit the cultivation of 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in their territory. This EU legislation does not permit the 
use of scientific evidence as the basis for decisions to reject the growing of GM crops, given that 
only those crops that have been approved as safe by the EFSA will be able to be grown, 
emphasising the confidence of the regulators in the safety of this technology.  
Although ostensibly designed to permit individual nations to reject cultivation of approved GM 
crops on their territory, the legislation could also have the effect of permitting others to 
circumvent the political bias currently driving EU regulation of GMOs and to make their own 
decisions on whether to grow GM crops. This opportunity has resulted in different decisions in 
different countries involved in ShARE. While England has announced that GM crops will be grown 
on its territory, the decision for Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland has been in the opposite 
direction. Ireland also made the decision to support the growing of GM crops. This situation adds 
to the complexity of the regulatory systems and the market context faced by developers of GM 
crops across the EU. 
In a related legislative initiative, less relevant to environmental issues, the EU Parliament rejected 
a proposal to allow EU member states to decide for themselves whether or not to import 
Genetically Modified Organisms for use in food and animal feed.  
3.5.4 International differences in regulatory systems for GMOs 
Governance frameworks in different parts of the world have shaped the way regulatory systems 
for genetically modified organisms (GMOs) have evolved since the 1980s. The most striking 
differences are between those of the European Union (EU) and its constituent countries and the 
United States (US) (Tait, 2008). Internationally, the EU has been very influential in shaping the UN 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the related Cartagena and Nagoya Protocols. On the 
other hand the US regulatory system has influenced and been more influenced by the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). These differences have 
                                                     
28 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/wsi/2002/3188/contents/made 
29 https://www.fsai.ie/legislation/food_legislation/gmos/regulating_gm_food_eu_ireland.html 
30 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015L0412&qid=1457367451353&from=EN 
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persisted since the 1980s. Each system has in its turn influenced the regulatory systems of other 
countries: similar approaches to that of the US are in operation in much of South America; while 
the European system has been most influential in Africa, although this has recently begun to 
change31. The Canadian regulatory system is regarded in international comparisons as the most 
appropriately adapted to managing the hazards of GMOs (Mittra et al., 2014). 
The reasons for the emergence and persistence of these different regulatory systems for GMOs 
are complex. The EU environmental lobbies have had greater political power than in the US and 
they have used this to achieve incorporation of a strong version of the precautionary principle 
into EU (and also UN) legislative systems (see Section 3.3). This in turn enabled these lobbyists to 
have a disproportionate impact on the public framing of these technologies generating public 
perceptions that are not based on good scientific evidence and which have persisted for 20 years 
(Tait, 2009a).  
In the EU, the regulatory system is described as ‘process based’, focusing on the process of 
genetic modification itself – all technologies developed using this process are treated equally by 
the regulatory system, regardless of their other properties. In the US and similar jurisdictions on 
the other hand, regulation is ‘product-based’, focusing on the properties of the resulting product, 
rather the process used to create it (Tait, 2008). Partly as a result of the regulatory system it has 
chosen to apply, the US has achieved a globally dominant role in the development of GM-related 
technologies.  
3.6 Critique of the current European regulatory system for GMOs. 
A broad range of organisations, several with governance-related remits have criticised the EU 
regulatory system for deliberate release of GM crops, for its process-based focus, lack of 
adaptation to evidence of safety of the products currently available, and the political overlay on 
regulatory decision making (e.g. ACRE, 2007; ACRE, 2013; Baulcombe et al., 2014; Mittra et al., 
2014; Tait and Barker, 2011). There appears to be a steady increase in the amount of 
authoritative criticism of the operation of the EU regulatory system and of the behaviour of some 
of the NGOs that have been most active in their antagonism to GM crops. The united coalition of 
advocacy groups (environmental, consumer, third world) that was so influential in framing 
European citizens’ understanding of GM crops in the 1990s (Tait, 2001) is no longer in existence. 
Two major pressure groups, the WorldWide Fund and the Royal Society for the Protection of 
Birds are now no longer campaigning on GM crops or synthetic biology. Friends of the Earth 
(USA) is actively campaigning against synthetic biology, but Friends of the Earth (UK) has not yet 
made any commitment. Also Friends of the Earth (UK) has collaborated with the Biotechnology 
and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC) in supporting a company’s efforts to meet a 
challenge related to the sustainability of its operations from other NGOs (including Friends of the 
Earth (US)). Also, rather than the previous advocacy on behalf or poor farmers who were 
presented as victims in debates about GMOs, there is now considerable evidence of the benefits 
to poor farmers from these technologies (Cressey, 2013), and developing countries are beginning 
to develop their own AIB-related research agendas (Falke-Zepeda et al., 2013). There is also a 
very different media environment compared to the 1990s and early 2000s, with most of the 
major newspapers and other media outlets taking a much more balanced approach to dealing 
with news items in the area of AIBs, supported by the Science Media Centre32.  
                                                     
31 http://mgafrica.com/article/2015-08-14-kenya-gmo; http://www.biowatch.org.za/list.php?cat=GM%20crops  
32 http://www.sciencemediacentre.org/ 
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However, from personal experience, including numerous discussions with key players in this area, 
there is still a prevailing atmosphere of nervousness among scientists and innovators that we 
could see a return of the vociferous negativity that has surrounded the development of GM crops 
in Europe, this time directed against synthetic biology and related techniques. Perhaps the 
greatest dangers here are that displaying this nervousness may (i) generate the feared response 
and/or (ii) lead to over-compensation such as avoiding research and development in key areas 
that could be of considerable benefit in future (e.g. avoiding working of organisms designed for 
deliberate release).  
In the EU since the 1980s, two governance related trajectories have been proceeding in different 
directions and with little or no coordination (Figure 7):  
i. the governance agenda described in Section 1.2 was bringing in a softer, more 
participative approach to governance including the concepts of upstream engagement 
and upstream regulation for new technologies in the earliest stages of development; and 
ii. existing product regulatory regimes were changing in the opposite direction, adding new 
regulatory hurdles in a reactive mode (as in a ratchet) each time a defect emerged in a 
product or process that had been initially regarded as safe (European Environment 
Agency (EEA), 2013; Tait and Levidow, 1992).  
This ‘regulatory ratchet’, has seen the cost to companies of meeting the demands of regulatory 
systems increase to a point where they inhibit the development of innovative technologies by 
even the largest multinational companies (the costs in Figure 7 (up to 15 years and >$1 Bn) refer 
to drug development; the costs for a GM crop in the EU are estimated to be €200 – 500 M, with a 
currently unlimited timescale (Mittra et al., 2014)). Figure 7 also illustrates how a negative public 
response to a new technology is most likely to arise at the point where a new technology makes 
the transition from the conduct of research to consideration of new products or processes to be 
made available in a market place (in a sense where the legally based regulatory system in 
operation in the lower portion of the figure meets the participative approach to governance at 
the earliest stages of research and development. 
Figure 7. Life science regulation: upstream governance and the regulatory ratchet. 
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The report by Baulcombe et al. (2014) notes that the commercial release of GM crops is subject 
to more stringent regulation than conventionally bred plants. It also notes that the “European 
Academies Science Advisory Council (EASAC) and others have pointed out that there is no 
rational basis for the current stringent EU regulatory process. There are no reliable data 
indicating inherent risk for human or animal health, for the environment or from unforeseen 
effects.”  
The current regulatory framework is not seen as conducive to enabling and encouraging small 
and medium-sized companies that may wish to apply for approval to market GM crops and 
derived products. Indeed, the associated costs and negative perceptions of the EU approval 
process have resulted in even large companies developing their new crops elsewhere in the 
world and withdrawing specific applications for cultivation in the EU marketplace (Tait, 2007).  
 
 
There is a new countervailing 
emphasis in the EU on achieving 
proportionality in regulatory systems 
and this could begin to have an impact 
on the future governance of AIBs. The 
EU Principle of Proportionality33, as 
set out in the Scottish Government 
‘Principles of Better Regulation’34, 
includes the provisions outlined in Box 
10.  
However a paper from the EU Food 
and Feed Chain Coalition (2015) points 
out that none of these principles is 
currently being applied in the context 
of the deliberate release of GMOs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
33 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/proportionality.html  
34 http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Business-Industry/support/better-regulation/5principlesofBetterRegulation   
Box 10. EU Principle of Proportionality and the 
Principles of Better Regulation: 
 
 Only intervene when necessary.  
 Remedies should be appropriate to the risk 
posed, and costs identified and minimised. 
 Policy solutions must be proportionate to the 
perceived problem or risk and justify the 
compliance costs imposed – don’t use a 
sledgehammer to crack a nut. 
 All the options for achieving policy objectives 
must be considered – not just prescriptive 
regulation. Alternatives may be more 
effective and cheaper to apply. 
 “Think small first”. Regulation can have a 
disproportionate impact on small businesses. 
 EC Directives should be transposed without 
‘gold plating’ (the process where a basic EC 
Directive is given extra strength when 
incorporated into national laws). 
 Enforcement regimes should be 
proportionate to the risk posed.  
 Regulators should consider an empowering 
and educational, rather than a punitive 
approach where possible. 
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4. Future governance of AIBs 
The above sections have attempted to set out the current governance background for GMOs, and 
to indicate how they will relate to the governance of AIBs in future. The overall conclusion is that 
current regulatory systems for GMOs in the EU will provide the basis for future regulation of AIBs 
and that this could unnecessarily restrict our future capacity to benefit from these technologies. 
However, it is important also to recognise that there are concerns about our capacity to 
understand and predict the outcomes of the new more powerful techniques. These perceptions 
of unpredictability and uncertainty are linked to the promotion of a strong interpretation of the 
PP that goes considerably beyond the EU recommendations outlined in Section 3.3. Running 
counter to this tendency to emphasise uncertainty, Nowotny (former president of the European 
Research Council) has made a powerful case for EU citizens to become more understanding and 
accommodating of uncertainty in their daily lives (Nowotny, 2016). The challenge for those 
charged with designing new regulatory systems and with implementing those currently in place is 
to steer an intelligent course between these countervailing tensions.  
This section first describes recent discussions in the EU on the future regulation of AIBs, and also 
the recent deliberations under the auspices of the UN CBD. Finally it looks at the future 
regulatory challenges likely to be raised by gene editing and gene drives.  
4.1 Future governance of AIBs in the EU 
Based on the above analysis, the EU is more likely than some other jurisdictions to err on the side 
of precaution in its consideration of the future governance and regulation of AIBs and it has 
begun the process of assessing the regulatory and other infrastructure needed to guide the 
future development of AIBs. The most significant outcome has been the development of three 
reports by the Scientific Committees - on Consumer Safety (SCCS), on Emerging and Newly 
Identified Health Risks (SCENIHR) and on Health and Environmental Risks (SCHER): 
i. Opinion on Synthetic Biology I – Definition35;  
ii. Opinion on Synthetic Biology II – Risk assessment methodologies and safety aspects36; 
iii. Opinion on Synthetic Biology III – Risks to the environment and biodiversity related to 
synthetic biology and research priorities in the field of synthetic biology37. 
The Scientific Committees considered five novel synthetic biology developments: (i) genetic part 
libraries and methods; (ii) minimal cells and designer chassis; (iii) protocells and artificial cells; (iv) 
xenobiology38; (v) DNA synthesis and genome editing. Of these developments, only (i) and (v) are 
likely to be relevant to the concerns of the EAs on a 5-10 year timescale.  
In Opinion I, synthetic biology is defined as “the application of science, technology and 
engineering to facilitate and accelerate the design, manufacture and/or modification of genetic 
materials in living organisms”. This definition is described as an operational definition that 
addresses the needs of risk assessment and is sufficiently broad to include new developments in 
the field. The paper also states that synthetic biology “… is currently encompassed within 
genetic modification as defined in the European Directives 2001/18/EC and 2009/41/EC and 
                                                     
35 http://ec.europa.eu/health/scientific_committees/emerging/docs/scenihr_o_044.pdf 
36 http://ec.europa.eu/health/scientific_committees/emerging/docs/scenihr_o_048.pdf 
37 http://ec.europa.eu/health/scientific_committees/emerging/docs/scenihr_o_050.pdf 
38 Xenobiology: biological systems based on forms of DNA, and manufacture of amino acids and proteins, that are 
not found in nature – an expanded genetic code. 
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will remain so in the foreseeable future.” The opinion emphasises the difficulty of defining 
accurately the relationship between GM and synthetic biology and has produced an additional 
list of criteria covering “… any organism, system, material, product or application resulting from 
the introduction, assembly or alteration of the genetic material in a living organism”.  
Opinion II focuses on the implications of likely developments in synthetic biology on human and 
animal health and the environment and on whether existing risk assessment practices for GMOs 
are adequate. It concludes that within the scope of current GMO regulations, risk assessment is 
challenging because of the lack of comparators and the increasing numbers of genetic 
modifications and engineered organisms. The areas described as most challenging are: (i) 
integration of protocells into living organisms and future developments of autonomous 
protocells; (ii) new xenobiological variants; (iii) DNA synthesis and direct genome editing of 
zygotes; and (iv) new multiplexed genetic modifications involving large scale DNA synthesis 
and/or highly parallel genome editing. Only the last of these developments is likely to be relevant 
to the EAs on a 5-10 year timescale. Current risk assessment methodologies are described as 
appropriate, with the addition of some safeguards to ensure continued safety protection while 
enabling scientific and technological advances. It also considers the use of ‘safety locks’39, 
concluding that no single technology in this area solves all biosafety risks and many new 
approaches will be necessary, and recommending development of a strategy for devising new 
forms of biological containment and combining different forms of containment. 
Opinion III addresses specific risks of synthetic biology to the environment, partly in the context 
of the UN CBD Decision XI/1140 that began the UN process “Noting, based on the precautionary 
approach, the need to consider the potential positive and negative impacts of components, 
organisms and products resulting from synthetic biology techniques on the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity” (see Section 4.2). This EU opinion appears biased in that it 
repeats, from CBD discussions, a list of negative impacts on land use that could be initiated by 
developments in synthetic biology, but does not mention the counterbalancing potential positive 
land use impacts that are also included in the CBD discussions (see Section 3.1 and 4.2). The risk 
factors identified are similar to those relevant to GMOs (accidental release, persistence in the 
environment, invasion or disruption of food webs, vertical or horizontal gene transfer). Where 
new threats are identified the opinion repeats the recommendations of Opinion II on the use of 
‘safety locks’ or ‘firewalls’ and under the heading of ‘genetic parts’ it recommends supporting 
research on interactions between modified and natural parts, development of new tools to 
predict emergent properties of organisms and potential failure modes, development of 
guidelines for risk assessors on the evaluation of emergent properties of engineered systems, and 
using GMOs with a proven safety record as comparators for risk assessment. Additional 
recommendations cover research requirements for a range of potential impacts on biodiversity 
and conservation. 
The recommendations of these reports, the last of which was published in Dec. 2015, have yet to 
be implemented but the statement above from Opinion I makes it clear that synthetic biology 
and its products are currently included under the EU regulatory system for GMOs. 
                                                     
39 ‘Safety locks’ provide a form of biological containment and include techniques that have been referred to in the 
context of GMOs as ‘genetic use restriction technologies’ (GURTS) and (pejoratively) as ‘terminator’ technology. 
Synthetic biology has the capability to greatly increase the effectiveness of such techniques.  
40 https://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-11/cop-11-dec-11-en.pdf 
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Synthetic biology and other AIBs are being targeted as campaigning issues by some of the NGOs 
that were influential in the anti GM campaigns that began in the 1990s, among the most 
prominent being the Canadian group ‘etc’41 and Friends of the Earth (USA)42, alongside a wide 
range of smaller campaigning bodies. These groups are actively engaged in attempting to 
influence future regulatory systems and policies for AIB development on the basis of an 
absolutist rather than a relativist approach to risk that ignores benefits and amplifies uncertainty 
(Tait, 2014). Included in their campaigning documents are suggestions that contained use of 
GMOs, as in industrial biotechnology, should no longer be treated as a less hazardous process 
than deliberate release and should be regulated through the EU Deliberate Release Directive. As 
in other areas of risk and uncertainty amplification, the case is based on vague speculation with 
no plausible scenarios proposed based on realistic future developments by companies. 
4.2 Future UN governance of AIBs 
The UN CBD Decision XI/II referred to above began a lengthy process of consultation and 
meetings on whether synthetic biology is a new and emerging issue under the CBD, in which case 
the CBD would be able to develop additional rules governing its use. These developments 
included a process of global consultation among a broad range of experts on seven key questions 
related to the relationship between synthetic biology and biodiversity and its future governance. 
The overall process and outcomes are summarised in the report produced by the Ad Hoc 
Technical Expert Group on Synthetic Biology on 7 October 201543, including the agreed 
operational definition of synthetic biology (very similar to the EU definition) for this process: 
“Synthetic biology is a further development and new dimension of modern biotechnology 
that combines science, technology and engineering to facilitate and accelerate the 
understanding, design, redesign, manufacture and/or modification of genetic materials, 
living organisms and biological systems.” 
The open-ended on-line discussion which was part of this process took place over the summer of 
2015 covering seven topics related to the impact of synthetic biology on biological diversity and 
the full set of responses can be seen on the CBD website44. The outcomes of these on-line 
discussions are summarised in a report of the Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group45 which also noted 
that 235 experts were nominated to participate in the forum and a total of 402 interventions 
were made. Up until 2015, the voices of the scientific and industry communities had been largely 
silent in debates surrounding the activities of the CBD, compared to the very strong 
representation from environmental advocacy groups (Kuiken, 2015), but the contributions to this 
latest forum were much more balanced across a range of stakeholder perspectives and interest-
based and value-based positions (See Table 2, Section 3.4). However, the summary report of the 
discussions did not reflect the full range of opinions expressed in these contributions46, 
underplaying those from scientists and industry and also from numerous policy makers and 
regulators. As a result of this broader stakeholder representation in the discussions it has been 
more difficult than in the past to reach agreed decisions on synthetic biology related issues in the 
                                                     
41 http://www.etcgroup.org/ 
42 http://www.foe.org/about-us/friends-of-the-earth-international 
43 https://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/synbio/synbioahteg-2015-01/official/synbioahteg-2015-01-03-en.pdf 
44 https://bch.cbd.int/synbio/open-ended/discussion.shtml 
45 https://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/synbio/synbioahteg-2015-01/official/synbioahteg-2015-01-02-en.pdf  
46 http://www.innogen.ac.uk/downloads/SBLC-REsponse-CBD-Notification_30Jan16.pdf  
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relevant committees and it is not yet clear whether the open-ended forum will have resolved 
these differences. 
4.3 The special case of gene editing 
The gene editing techniques described in Box 1 are very powerful: they can greatly speed up 
research and therefore the productivity of the researchers, enabling the products to enter into 
industrial production more rapidly, provided industry can see viable commercial opportunities 
based on them. As noted above, in the EU at least, it is the intention that synthetic biology will be 
regulated through the same system as currently applies to GMOs. However, in the case of gene 
editing, discussion has revolved around whether or not gene editing should be regarded as a 
development of synthetic biology, one of the challenges being that, in some cases, it will be 
impossible to tell what method was used to produce a new plant variety (BBSRC, 2014; Postnote, 
2015). 
The BBSRC (2014) report describes new benefits arising from gene drives but does not refer to 
any hew hazards that would not be controlled through existing regulatory systems. However they 
do emphasise the need for proactive discussion with a broad range of stakeholders to provide 
the context within which these technologies should be evaluated.  They also call for a new trait-
based, rather than process-based, approach to regulation involving evidence-based risk 
assessment, to deliver proportionality in EU regulatory systems. 
Despite some suggestions to the contrary, the EU definition of synthetic biology does seem to 
cover gene editing although delay in deciding if GM regulations apply to gene editing is claimed 
to be affecting important scientific research (Abbott, 2015). Also, experience with GMOs in the 
EU suggests that having made the decision to regulate this technology as a GMO will not 
necessarily facilitate future innovative developments. 
In the USA on the other hand some products of gene editing are now entering commercial 
development without being regulated:  
 US regulators have ruled that several products of gene editing do not fall under the remit 
of their regulatory system (Editorial, 2016); 
 In a case described as the ‘unregulation’ of GM crops (Grens, 2015) an apple variety 
(Arctic apple) designed not to brown on exposure to air has been deemed not to require 
regulation as a GMO; and  
 The US Department of Agriculture has decided not to regulate a mushroom genetically 
edited using CRISPR-Cas9 to resist browning [http://www.nature.com/news/gene-edited-
crispr-mushroom-escapes-us-regulation-1.19754?WT.ec_id=NEWSDAILY-20160415]. 
The common feature in these US examples is that these products do not contain foreign DNA 
from ‘plant pests’ such as viruses or bacteria, the criterion that would lead to their capture by the 
US regulatory system, although there may still be a voluntary review by the US Food and Drug 
Administration to check on safety for human consumption. These and other anomalies arising in 
the US product-based regulatory approach are leading to reconsideration of the current 
regulatory system for AIBs in light of these new developments (Ledford, 2016).  
The techniques covered under the heading of gene editing will require more varied and nuanced 
consideration than would be possible under the general heading of ‘GMO’ and we may be only at 
the beginning of a new round of debate and dialogue on these issues. There are no apparent 
threats to biological diversity or to other aspects of environmental safety from gene editing 
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technologies that would trigger the application of the PP, as specified in the EU guidance (Box 7). 
However, it may be wise to conduct some formal scenario analyses to explore more fully these 
assumptions of safety. 
4.4 Issues arising from gene drive technologies 
One of the AIB techniques described in Box 1, the gene drive, currently in early stages of 
development, will require special consideration on how it should be governed (Oye et al., 2014). 
The key difference between a gene drive and other AIBs is that the genetic trait is built into its 
DNA in a way that ensures that it is passed down through generations and can spread quickly and 
permanently through an entire population. If the trait is deleterious or lethal it can wipe out the 
target population but it is only effective in species that reproduce sexually and do so rapidly. 
Potentially attractive applications include wiping out malaria-bearing mosquitoes in a region or 
eliminating alien invasive rodent species from an island ecosystem where they are having 
negative impacts on biodiversity. (US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 
2016)  
Gene drives will not be governable under current GMO regulations, all of which currently require 
demonstration that, either an organism will not spread in the natural environment or that it will 
not cause any fundamental change in ecosystems if it does so. It is also important to note that 
gene drives, being a potentially one-off development with no commercially attractive business 
model, will most likely be developed by governments, or at least under close government 
supervision, making their governance more controllable, particularly in the early stages of 
development. However, from the point of view of the EAs, there are not as yet any likely 
applications of gene drives within their territory.  
The Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the Environment has produced a useful policy 
report on gene drives (Westra et al., 2016), recommending: 
  Adapting current legislation so that it is no longer possible to inadvertently create a gene 
drive;  
 That  authorisation should only be granted if sufficient information is available to answer 
all questions in the risk assessment to ensure the safe use of organisms with a gene drive 
and provide an opportunity to gain knowledge about the way gene drives work and their 
impact; and  
 That an international approach should be sought since this may concern organisms and 
potential effects on human health and the environment that could spread across national 
borders.  
Also, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences has published recommendations for responsible 
practices on gene drive research in non-human species (US National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering, and Medicine, 2016). 
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5. Conclusions and recommendations: a proportionate and adaptive approach to the 
governance of AIBs 
The objectives of this analysis are: 
i. To assess the scale and likely impact of AIBs on the ability of the UK and ROI to regulate 
the relevant sectors in future;  
ii. To advise on the development of a proportionate approach to regulation of these sectors, 
given the potential future timeline of developments and commercial adoption, and given 
that the capacity of the sectors to deliver the expected impact, positive or negative, will 
depend on the regulatory approach adopted;  
iii. To identify and explain (with evidence) any current and potential future risks that may not 
be covered by the proposed regulatory approaches, including both contained use and 
deliberate release; and  
iv. To stimulate and guide future discussions among the UK and Republic of Ireland (ROI) EAs 
and also AIB-related practitioners and the wider public. 
The analysis in Sections 2 – 4 is based on research and experience since the 1980s on the 
development of GMOs and other AIBs, covering objectives (i) – (iii). To summarise the key points 
in the analysis. 
i. AIBs could have major contributions to the bioeconomy and the circular economy, in the 
UK and globally. 
ii. On a 5-10 year timescale, the innovations arising from AIBs are expected to be 
incremental rather than disruptive for the industry sectors involved. 
iii. This means that the expected innovations are unlikely to raise additional public concerns, 
beyond those already raised by some applications of GMOs, or to lead to a need for 
additional regulatory oversight, except among advocacy groups that engage with the 
technology from an ‘in principle’, ideological perspective. 
iv. The regulatory systems to be applied to AIBs in the EU will be those currently in place for 
GMOs in contained use and deliberate release. 
v. A major threat to achieving some of the expected benefits from these AIBs in non-
contained uses arises from the current EU regulatory system that is widely seen as not 
being sufficiently proportionate or adaptive to available knowledge and evidence of their 
benefits and hazards. 
vi. Among some regulators, policy makers and company managers, there is a persistent, 
probably unjustified, impression that a majority of the EU population is ideologically 
opposed to GM crops and a fear that this will be extended to AIBs. 
vii. Several prominent environmental advocacy groups and a large number of much smaller 
groups are attempting to raise concerns, so far unsupported by realistic scenarios, about 
the contained use of AIBs and the hazards to the environment in the event of an escape 
from containment. 
viii. There is insufficient understanding among policy makers and regulators of how to 
interpret data from stakeholder engagement and opinion polls, and how to conduct 
future engagement in this context with its history of misunderstandings and 
misinterpretation.  
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Section 5 focuses on objective (iv), considering on what basis, how, with whom, and when to 
stimulate further discussion to inform the work of the EAs. Section 5.1 describes the background 
to the proposals and recommendations introduced in Sections 5.2 – 5.4. Section 5.2 describes an 
approach to working within the changing decision making environment for policy makers and 
regulators, involving new or more insistent demands to ensure that regulations are proportionate 
and adaptive to the properties of innovative technologies and that they do not unnecessarily 
inhibit innovation. Engagement and dialogue with citizens and stakeholders is an important 
component of innovation governance and will contribute to future discussions and policy 
decisions on AIBs. It could usefully build on improved understanding of the complex motivations 
and interactions within and between societal and professional groups and Section 5.3 offers 
guidelines relevant to this process. Section 5.4 describes an approach that could usefully be 
adopted as a basis for integrating understandings and actions required to manage the 
governance of AIBs in the next 5 – 10 years. Section 5.5 makes recommendations for the EAs in 
delivering such a strategy.  
5.1 The potential impacts of AIB-related innovation 
AIBs have the potential to exert a major impact on the global bioeconomy, to enable us to reduce 
our ecological footprint and to “tread more lightly on the planet” (Wackernagel and Rees, 1996). 
They are a key component of future plans to build a circular economy, as committed to by all the 
governments of the countries and regions involved in ShARE (see Section 2.2) and there is 
significant government investment in a broad range of initiatives designed to support this 
outcome.  
Section 2.1 considered the extent to which the AIBs likely to be developed in the next 5 – 10 
years could have disruptive impacts on product types or lead to radical restructuring of industry 
sectors, and concluded that innovation on this timescale is likely to be mainly incremental, with 
some disruption of manufacturing processes in contained use of AIBs. The companies likely to 
take a lead in delivering these expected benefits to the bioeconomy will be the multinational 
industrial biotechnology, pharmaceutical, agro-biotechnology, seed and food companies 
operating in today’s chemicals and fossil fuel based sectors. 
An important constraint on the economic potential of AIBs will be that, given the scale of existing 
regulatory hurdles (Section 2.2), small and medium-sized companies will not be able to innovate 
independently of the strategies of the major multinational companies (Tait, 2007). There are 
many currently feasible developments that could be commercially attractive to these smaller, 
younger companies and the ability of the bioeconomy to contribute to a circular economy will be 
limited if they are not able to address the local needs and opportunities that could make major 
differences to ecological footprints. An additional factor, impossible to quantify, is that smart 
innovators will avoid altogether undertaking the necessary research and development to deliver 
these types of benefit, again to the potential detriment of the circular economy.  
The Innogen Institute’s research programme47 (Figure 8) has demonstrated the extent to which 
the regulatory systems in place for life science based industries, in addition to ensuring the 
safety, quality and efficacy of products and processes, will determine:  
                                                     
47 http://www.innogen.ac.uk/downloads/Innogen-Institute-Research-Outline.pdf 
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 the innovation strategies of 
companies,  
 the extent to which the disruptive 
innovations that could respond to 
currently-unmet societal needs are able to 
be developed,  
 the innovativeness of industry 
sectors, 
 the geographic location of 
companies,  
 the scale of operations of the 
companies involved, and 
 ultimately, the relative competitive 
advantage of the regions and nations of 
the world.  
For AIBs the regulatory systems in operation for a sector (i.e. the governance relationship 
between policy makers/regulators and scientists/innovators in Figure 8) could be the primary 
factor in enabling or constraining the emergence of a circular economy. More adaptive and 
proportionate governance of innovative technologies is increasingly seen to be the answer to 
such problems, along with the introduction of an ‘innovation imperative’ (OECD 2015). However, 
there is little guidance for policy makers and regulators on how this should be achieved, and this 
report attempts to fill that gap.  
The citizen/stakeholder perspective included in Figure 8 is also an important component of the 
approach to governance introduced in Section 1.2 and elaborated in the context of AIBs in 
Section 3.4. Without the markets that citizens and stakeholders will provide, there will be no 
commercially viable innovation and, as has been clearly demonstrated through the EU regulatory 
system for GMOs, their advocacy influence on policy makers and regulators can have an equally 
decisive role in determining what technologies are able to be developed. Again there has been 
little critical guidance on how to manage these interactions more constructively than has been 
the case to date. 
5.2 Supporting decision making on proportionate and adaptive regulation of AIBs. 
Regulators and policy makers are increasingly tasked, beyond their roles in maintaining safety, 
quality and efficacy in products and processes, with ensuring that regulations are proportionate 
to the expected risks from novel technologies and are also adaptive to the need to facilitate the 
development of useful innovations (Tait and Banda, 2016a, 2016b). Our conclusion that existing 
regulatory systems for GMOs will be adopted and will be adequate to deal with the expected 
developments of AIBs is supported by the UN on-line consultation undertaken in 2015 (Section 
4.2) where a very large body of opinion across researchers, innovators, policy makers and 
regulators considered that existing regulatory approaches, applied on a case-by-case basis as in 
current practice, will be adequate to deal with these new technologies and their potential 
impacts on biodiversity.  
Where contributors to the UN on-line consultation (Section 4.2) were concerned about the 
hazards arising from synthetic biology, these were couched in general terms. None of the 
statements about future risks provided the kind of detailed scenario that would be needed to 
meet the criteria for adoption of the PP according to the EC Guidelines (Box 7). Speculation based 
Figure 8. Innogen Institute research framework: 
key actors and their impacts 
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on greater complexity, greater volume of activity, or greater power in the techniques available, 
without further elaboration, would not be sufficient to stimulate additional regulatory action. 
Indeed, experience in other industry sectors, such as motor vehicles, aircraft, or pharmaceuticals, 
suggests that greater power and complexity and greater volume of activity is associated with 
improved safety.  
The choice to regulate next generation AIBs through the system in place for GMOs, can be seen 
as potentially providing reassurance to those concerned about potential environmental hazards. 
However, meeting the requirements for regulatory approaches also to be more proportionate 
and adaptive to the needs of innovative 
technologies (Section 3.6) could be seen as a 
requirement to go beyond the status quo and 
consider how the current systems could be made 
more adaptive based on evidence of the lack of 
environmental hazards arising from the GMOs in 
use throughout the world today. Given that EU 
regulations on deliberate release of GMOs are 
increasingly being criticised by well-informed 
authoritative sources for lack of proportionality and 
adaptation it will be important for regulators and 
policy makers to learn from past experience of the 
safe and environmentally beneficial development of 
GM crops, including experience beyond the 
boundaries of the EU.  
Box 11 summarises the key requirements of an 
adaptive approach to the governance of innovative 
technologies being developed by the Innogen 
Institute (Lowrie and Tait, 2011; Tait and Barker, 
2011) and Section 5.4 describes how this could be 
implemented through an approach being developed 
in collaboration with the British Standards 
Institution (BSI).  
Box 11 Adaptive Governance of 
Innovative Technologies 
A more adaptive risk governance 
approach for AIBs would aim to be: 
 enabling of innovation,  
 minimising risk to people and 
the environment, and  
 balancing the interests and 
values of all relevant 
stakeholders.  
It would provide for trade-offs 
between these factors and support 
smarter regulatory approaches that 
balance potential societal and 
economic benefits and potential risks, 
particularly where both are uncertain 
in the early stages of technology 
development. 
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5.3 Constructive stakeholder engagement 
Stakeholder engagement is an important component of the governance process, as described in 
Section 1.2 and the problems experienced in the conduct of stakeholder engagement in the EU, 
outlined in Section 3.4 are still to some extent unresolved. There is a continuing perception in 
policy circles of the desirability of upstream engagement at as early a stage as possible in the 
development of a novel technology (Figure 7) but little recognition of the difficulties and biases 
that can be introduced through such an approach (Table 3) (Tait and Barker, 2011). 
 
Table 3. Problems in applying upstream engagement to innovative technologies 
Group think  
The views of small groups will be easily swayed by participants 
with strong opinions or by those leading the engagement. 
Issue framing 
Given our ignorance about the future, engagement can be a 
process of fictitiously framing new science and technology in the 
minds of the public. 
Recruitment bias 
It is difficult to persuade uncommitted citizens to participate in 
hypothetical discussions about science and innovation a long 
time in the future – those who engage are likely to have a specific 
agenda.  
Conflict 
Where there is polarisation of views, engagement can lead to 
increased levels of conflict. 
Engagement focus 
Some topics (e.g. synthetic biology, nanotechnology) are too 
broad and multi-faceted to allow meaningful engagement. 
Engagement fatigue 
There will be insufficient time and resources to engage on every 
relevant issue and people will become cynical about the process 
Labile public opinion 
People who do not already have strong opinions will change their 
minds over quite short timescales, much more so over 5-10 
years. 
 
There is a need for better understanding of these and other pitfalls and for guidance on how to 
avoid them. The recommendations in Box 12, part of the Innogen Institute guidance on 
Constructive Stakeholder Engagement (Tait and Barker, 2011; Tait, 2009), are relevant to the 
questions raised above in relation to objective (iv) - on what basis, how, with whom, and when to 
stimulate discussion to inform the work of the EAs. They are seen as a counter-balance to the EU 
approach that has seen the governance of GMOs and related technologies become increasingly 
dominated by the values of a vociferous minority48. 
                                                     
48 http://www.innogen.ac.uk/downloads/ConsultationResponse_HOC_EURegulationOfLifeSciences.pdf 
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Box 12. Constructive Stakeholder Engagement 
 Engage about innovation and regulatory processes, as well as science and technology. 
 Consider benefits of the technology and balance against costs and risks. 
 Develop standards for engagement including standards for the quality of evidence on 
which decisions are based. 
 In a plural democracy, maintain choice as far as possible. 
 Have an open discussion, including the full range of relevant opinions (general 
public/citizens, scientists, industry, users of the technology, consumers). 
 No single perspective should dominate other opinions. 
 Manage expectations – it is unlikely that all stakeholder views can be accommodated.  
 Careful timing – too early and its value will be undermined by the level of uncertainty 
around the nature of future developments; too late and stakeholder opinions and 
political positions may have become entrenched, leading to the risk of further 
polarisation and making accommodation more difficult to achieve.  
42 
5.4 Combining proportionate, adaptive governance and constructive stakeholder engagement  
The Innogen Institute report to the BSI49 (Tait and Banda, 2016 a, b) considers how to achieve 
proportionate, adaptive governance alongside a more constructive approach to stakeholder 
engagement, and is relevant to AIBs and the remit of the EAs. The report develops a governance 
framework (Figure 9), applicable across a range of advanced innovative technologies with widely 
differing histories and experiences of regulation, including synthetic biology/industrial 
biotechnology.  
The green arrow on the left of Figure 9 represents the value chain50 for an AIB, alongside a much-
simplified representation of the stages of development, from early stage research and 
development (R&D) through early and late translational stages to marketing. The central set of 
relationships in Figure 9 shows how, across these different developmental stages, the 
components of the regulatory system (standards, guidelines and regulations) will play different 
roles involving ‘soft’, ‘firm’ and ‘hard’ law51 at different stages of development. Where regulation 
of human and environmental hazards is involved, the governance system will move closer to hard 
law as products near market-readiness.  
Figure 9. Framework combining proportionate and adaptive governance of innovative 
technologies with a constructive approach to stakeholder engagement (British Standards 
Institution Report (Tait and Banda (2016b)) 
 
                                                     
49 Numerous types of standards are used by industry for a broad range of purposes. The BSI report focuses on the 
relatively orderly, authoritative and widely applicable types of standard developed by national standards bodies, 
such as the BSI, and international standards organisations, comparing the roles and impacts of such standards to 
those of regulations and the guidelines developed by regulators in support of regulation, and proposing greater 
integration of standards within a governance process to deliver proportionality and integration. 
50 The following definition of a ‘value chain’ (Mastroeni et al., 2014) adapts its use to life science sectors: “ ‘Value 
chain’ describes the full range of activities required to bring a product from conception to end use and beyond, 
including design, production, marketing, distribution and support to the final consumer. …. Depending on the nature 
of the opportunity and the complexity of the route to exploiting it, the value chain will encompass a number of firms 
with different business models operating in sequence or in parallel.”  
51 Hard law has government based legislative enforcement to ensure compliance; firm law is backed up by some 
form of legislative authority but may not be legally enforced; soft law has no formal legislative authority and relies 
on codes of conduct reinforced by peer pressure or (for some standards) market related mechanisms. 
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The BSI report (Tait and Banda, 2016 a, b) considers how an enhanced, more integrated role for 
standards in governance processes could deliver the required proportionality and adaptation as 
illustrated in this central set of relationships. The right hand side of Figure 9 draws attention to 
the different sets of demands raised by disruptive and incremental innovation, and also the 
potential role of a Framework Standard in stakeholder engagement (Section 5.4.1).  
To summarise how proportionality could be achieved for a disruptive AIB-related innovation for 
which there is no existing regulatory precedent, reading from top to bottom of the diagram, the 
governance process should: 
i. In the early R&D stage (Stage 1) of developing the technology, focus on consensus standards 
devised in collaboration with companies and scientists with expertise in the area to consider 
what the potential hazards might be, how they could be addressed and whether there are 
any relevant existing regulatory systems; 
ii. As experience is gained and the likely future nature of the emerging innovative products and 
processes becomes clarified (Stage 2), adapt these standards and begin to formalise them as 
guidelines that could then form the basis of a future regulatory system (this stage involving 
companies and scientists and also regulators and policy makers);  
iii. Once the nature of the innovation and its future potential have been clarified, again In an 
open democratic process involving all interested stakeholders, develop legally binding 
regulations, couched in general terms relating to the desired outcome of the regulation; and 
iv. At the marketing stage (Stage 4), again in an open democratic process involving all interested 
stakeholders, devise standards and guidelines to support compliance by those engaged in 
developing the new technology. 
The innovations arising from AIBs on a 5 – 10 year timescale are likely to be incremental in nature 
and to be regulated through the existing GMO regulatory systems which, in the EU, involve 
legally-based regulations having the status of ‘hard law’ (Section 3.5). For AIBs, as incremental 
innovations, from stage (iii) above the concern is mainly how to adapt these regulations and 
guidelines to make them more proportionate to the expected hazards and benefits. The BSI 
Governance Framework proposes that development and adoption of standards, working 
alongside existing regulatory guidelines or replacing them in some cases, with the involvement of 
a broad range of stakeholders could play an important role in enabling such adaptation. 
The process outlined above for Stages (i) – (iv) of the innovation process intentionally implies a 
different approach to stakeholder engagement in stages (i) and (ii) where the nature of products 
and their potential benefits and hazards are ill-defined and mutable. At Stages (iii) and (iv) these 
properties will have been sufficiently defined to allow an informed consideration of relevant 
issues by all stakeholders. The next section (5.4.1) describes how a Framework Standard could 
guide overall stakeholder dialogue and engagement, including at Stages (i) and (ii), as a 
contribution to future more adaptive and proportionate governance of AIBs. 
5.4.1 The potential of a Framework Standard 
Figure 9 includes the role of a Framework Standard for the responsible development of 
innovative technologies (Steedman, 2013) to resolve some of the difficulties with governance and 
stakeholder engagement that have been experienced in the EU in the context for AIBs (Section 
3.4). A Framework Standard is a voluntary consensus standard, similar to the Environmental 
Management Standard , developed by BSI and now administered through the International 
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Standards Organisation as ISO 1400152. For a disruptive innovation, its development could begin 
at the earliest stages of R&D, whereas for an incremental innovation it could be introduced at 
any point along the innovation value chain.  
An important part of the value of such a Framework Standard would be in enabling a more 
constructive approach to stakeholder engagement, at all stages along an innovation pathway, 
answering the questions on the timing, basis and constituency for engagement initiatives 
(Section 5.3). A well-executed stakeholder engagement can cost up to £100K and in the early 
R&D stage of development of an AIB it is not appropriate (because of lack of scientific evidence) 
or valid (given the issues raised in Table 3) to conduct stakeholder engagement for specific 
innovations. However, in the later stages of an innovation pathway (Stages 3 and 4 in Figure 9) 
evidence will be available on the technical and commercial feasibility of specific innovations and 
their expected properties and it would be appropriate to involve all interested citizens in 
considering how the technology should be governed. 
The value of a Framework Standard in the context of AIBs would lie:  
i. In guiding the type of dialogue undertaken at different stages of an innovation pathway, 
bringing together relevant stakeholders at each stage, and including standards for the 
conduct of a dialogue similar to those described in Box 11, taking into account the timing 
and other pitfalls outlined in Table 3; and  
ii. In the potential involvement of all stakeholders at Stage 4, in monitoring and ensuring 
adherence to the requirements of standards introduced to ensure implementation of 
regulations and guidelines. 
                                                     
52 http://www.bsigroup.com/en-GB/iso-14001-environmental-management/ISO-14001-revision-new/ 
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5.5 Recommendations: potential roles for the EAs in future governance of AIBs 
The EAs, in fulfilling their roles as outlined in Section 1.3, occupy an important position at the 
interface between the regulatory systems and those involved in implementing them, both in 
ensuring environmental protection and sustainable economic growth and in alerting 
governments to future hazards and regulatory requirements. Much could be gained from a more 
strategic approach to the governance of AIBs that takes account of the factors outlined in this 
report and the EAs could play a prominent role in such a strategy.  
Through the future discussions referred to in Objective (iv), the EAs could begin the process of 
informing themselves and those with whom they engage about their national and regional needs 
and concerns, covering the following aspects: 
i. The potential contributions of AIBs within their territory to the circular economy and the 
bioeconomy including –  
 The availability and carrying capacity of natural resources and/or by-products 
from current production processes as feedstock for AIB-related processes; 
 The opportunities for industries to contribute more effectively to a circular 
economy;  
 Companies’ plans for future AIB-related developments and how they could 
contribute to a national agenda for a circular economy. 
ii. Engaging across the regulatory interface to influence future governance-related 
developments for AIBs –  
 Based on a good appreciation of the likely future developments in their areas of 
authority and their potential impacts, positive and/or negative, on the regional 
environment (derived from (i) above);  
 To ensure that the governance and regulatory systems deployed at national and 
regional levels are proportionate and adaptive and able to minimise any hazards 
arising from AIBs in future while maximising the benefits. 
iii. Developing an on-going dialogue with citizens and other relevant stakeholders –  
 To support better understanding of their needs and desires and of the underlying 
motivations; 
 To enable more effective evidence-based communication on potential hazards 
and benefits of existing and new AIBs; 
 To avoid unnecessary polarisation of opinion in the future management of AIB 
development. 
The frameworks and guidelines described in Sections 5.2 – 5.4 could provide a basis for the 
conduct of these discussions and could also contribute to the development of future strategies 
for the governance of AIBs in a manner that enables them to deliver their full potential to the 
bioeconomy and the circular economy, and also to the improvement of the natural environment. 
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